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______ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
POGUE, Judge.  
Jose Gonzalez (AGonzalez@ or AAppellant@) appeals the 
District Court of New Jersey=s grant of summary judgment 
dismissing his petition for review of the United States 
Citizenship and Immigration Service=s (AUSCIS@) denial of his 
naturalization application.  USCIS denied Gonzalez=s 
application on good moral character grounds for giving false 
testimony in an immigration proceeding after Gonzalez affirmed 
during his I-751 interview that he had no children and later held 
out two children, YGP and AGP, as his own.  The District Court 
held that because uncontradicted evidence indicated that 
Gonzalez lied in his I-751 interview, there was no genuine issue 
of material fact for trial.  For the reasons that follow, we hold 
that no genuine issue of material fact existed on the record 
before the District Court and will affirm the District Court=s 
grant of summary judgment. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
Gonzalez is a native of Panama and a citizen of Spain.  
He entered the United States as a non-immigrant visitor in or 
around 1998.  Around 1999, Gonzalez met a United States 
citizen, Inez Otero, and the two were married on February 4, 
2000.  By virtue of his marriage to Otero, Gonzalez=s status was 
adjusted to conditional lawful permanent resident on May 19, 
2001.  On August 3, 2004, Gonzalez and Otero appeared 
together at an interview in support of Gonzalez=s Form I-751 
Petition to Remove the Conditions on Residence (AForm I-751@). 
 During the interview Gonzalez affirmed, under oath, his written 
statement on Form I-751 that he did not have children of his 
own.  Following the interview, the conditions on Gonzalez=s 
residence were lifted.  On March 7, 2005, Gonzlez=s marriage to 
Otero was legally dissolved through a Judgment of Divorce.  
Otero was not the only woman with whom Gonzalez was 
romantically involved.  Beginning in 1998, and through the 
duration of his marriage, Gonzalez was also romantically 
involved with Margarete Picinin.  During this time, Picinin gave 
birth to two children: YGP in 2000 and AGP in 2001.  Gonzalez 
supported Picinin financially before, during, and after her 
pregnanciesCall while still married to Otero.  In early August of 
2004, prior to his divorce, Gonzalez moved out of his marital 
home and into the apartment occupied by Picinin and her 
children.  On March 31, 2005, following the Judgment of 
Divorce, Gonzalez amended the birth certificates of YGP and 
AGP to reflect that he was their father. 
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On December 19, 2006, Gonzalez filed a Form N-400 
Application for Naturalization (AForm N-400@).  On his Form N-
400, Gonzalez listed YGP and AGP as his children for the first 
time in the course of his immigration proceedings.  Noting that 
this was inconsistent with his statements in the I-751 interview, 
USCIS determined that Gonzalez had provided false testimony 
during that interview and, on October 26, 2007, denied his 
petition on the grounds that he lacked the requisite good moral 
character.  
Following administrative appeal, Gonzalez received a 
final denial of naturalization on June 12, 2009.  On June 24, 
2009, USCIS served on Gonzalez a Form I-862 Notice to 
Appear and filed the Notice with the Newark New Jersey 
Immigration Court, thereby initiating removal proceedings 
against him.
1
  On July 10, 2009, Gonzalez filed a petition for de 
novo review with the District Court for the District of New 
Jersey pursuant to 8 U.S.C. ' 1421(c) (2006).2  On cross 
motions for summary judgment, the District Court denied 
Gonzalez=s motion and granted the Government=s motion, 
holding that Athe uncontradicted evidence is that Petitioner, 
while under penalty of perjury, gave false evidence in order to 
receive a benefit in an immigration proceeding.@ Gonzalez v. 
Napolitano, No. 2:09-cv-03426, 2011 WL 941299, at *7 (D.N.J. 
                                                 
1
 The removal proceedings against Gonzalez remain 
pending as of this appeal. 
2
 All subsequent citations to the United States Code will 
be to the 2006 edition unless otherwise noted. 
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Mar. 16, 2011).  Gonzalez timely appealed the District Court=s 
decision on May 10, 2011. 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court had jurisdiction over this action 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. ' 1421(c),3 and we have jurisdiction over 
this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1291. 
We review a ADistrict Court=s grant of summary judgment 
de novo, applying the same standard the District Court applied.@ 
Alcoa, Inc. v. United States, 509 F.3d 173, 175 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(citing Doe v. County of Centre, Pa., 242 F.3d 437, 447 (3d Cir. 
2001)). When reviewing a grant of summary judgment the court 
Amust view the facts in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party and draw all inferences in that party=s favor.@ 
Stratechuk v. Bd. of Educ., S. Orange-Maplewood Sch. Dist., 
587 F.3d 597, 603 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. 
Basell USA Inc., 512 F.3d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 2008)).   
                                                 
3
 Whether a district court may review a denial of 
naturalization pursuant to 8 U.S.C. ' 1421(c) when a removal 
proceeding is pending is currently in dispute among the courts of 
appeals.  This question was decided by the District Court in a 
separate opinion, see Gonzalez v. Napolitano, 684 F. Supp. 2d 
555 (D.N.J. 2010), and raised before this court in a footnote of 
the Government=s brief, see Appellee=s Br. 2 n.2.  Because we 
have not previously resolved this issue, it is discussed below in 
section III.A.  
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. District Court Review under 8 U.S.C. ' 1421(c) 
Prior to 1990, the authority to naturalize aliens and the 
authority to remove aliens were vested, respectively, in the 
courts and the Attorney General. See 8 U.S.C. '' 1251, 1421(a) 
(1988); see also Shomberg v. United States, 348 U.S. 540, 
543B44 (1955).  As naturalization and removal were mutually 
exclusive, this bifurcation of authority sometimes led to Aa race 
between the alien to gain citizenship and the Attorney General to 
deport him.@ Id. at 544.  In 1950, intending to end this race, 
Congress enacted 8 U.S.C. ' 1429, providing that Ano petition 
for naturalization shall be finally heard by a naturalization court 
if there is pending against the petitioner a deportation 
proceeding . . . .@ 8 U.S.C. ' 1429 (1952); see also Shomberg, 
348 U.S. at 544B45. 
In 1990, Congress conferred upon the Attorney General, 
Asole authority to naturalize persons as citizens of the United 
States . . . .@  Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 
' 401(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5038 (1990) (codified at 8 U.S.C. ' 
1421(a)).  With authority for both naturalization and removal 
vested in the Attorney General, ' 1429 was amended to read, 
Ano application for naturalization shall be considered by the 
Attorney General if there is pending against the applicant a 
removal proceeding . . . .@ 8 U.S.C. ' 1429; ' 407(d)(3), 104 
Stat. at 5041 (amending 8 U.S.C. ' 1429).  Thus, priority for 
removal proceedings was maintained.  The Immigration Act of 
1990 did not, however, remove the courts entirely from the 
naturalization process.  Rather, the Act reaffirmed the right of a 
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petitioner to judicial review by giving the district courts the 
power to review, de novo, decisions by the Attorney General 
denying naturalization. ' 401(c), 104 Stat. at 5038 (codified at 8 
U.S.C. ' 1421(c)).4   
                                                 
4
 Section 1421(c) reads in relevant part: 
 
A person whose application for naturalization 
under this subchapter is denied, after a hearing 
before an immigration officer under section 
1447(a) of this Title, may seek review of such 
denial before the United States district court for 
the district in which such person resides in 
accordance with chapter 7 of title 5. Such review 
shall be de novo, and the court shall make its own 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and shall, 
at the request of the petitioner, conduct a hearing 
de novo on the application.  
 
8 U.S.C. ' 1421(c). 
We are now faced with the question, unresolved by the 
statute, of whether ' 1429 forecloses judicial review pursuant to 
' 1421(c) whenever a removal proceeding is pending.  Prior to 
the 1990 amendments, we held in In re Terzich, 256 F.2d 197, 
200 (3d Cir. 1958), that courts could not exercise jurisdiction 
over naturalization so long as a removal proceeding was 
pending.  However, we have since questioned, in a non-
precedential opinion, whether Terzich remains valid in light of 
the 1990 amendments. See Apokarina v. Ashcroft, 93 F. App=x. 
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469, 471B72 (3d Cir. 2004).  Today we resolve the question 
raised in Apokarina by holding that district courts have 
jurisdiction to review a denial of naturalization during the 
pendency of removal proceedings and may issue a declaratory 
judgment regarding the lawfulness of such denial. 
In resolving this question, we must address both the 
district courts= jurisdiction and their capacity to grant effective 
relief.  On the issue of jurisdiction, we find the Ninth Circuit=s 
analysis of the issue compelling. See De Lara Bellajaro v. 
Schiltgen, 378 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2004).  In Bellajaro, the 
Ninth Circuit found that  
[n]othing in the text [of ' 1421(c)] limits the 
jurisdiction so conferred to review of denials 
when there is no removal proceeding pending.  By 
the same token, the text of ' 1429 B which does 
constrain consideration of naturalization 
applications during the pendency of a removal 
proceeding B clearly applies to the Attorney 
General.  There is no hint in the language of ' 
1429 that it also applies to the courts. 
Id. at 1046.  Based on the plain language of the statute, we 
concur with the Ninth Circuit that there is Ano textual basis for 
concluding that jurisdiction vested in district courts by ' 1421(c) 
is divested by ' 1429.@ Id.; see also Zayed v. United States, 368 
F.3d 902, 906 (6th Cir. 2004) (A[W]e do not read the amended ' 
1429 as divesting the district courts of the jurisdiction granted 
under ' 1421(c).@). 
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The Ninth Circuit ultimately concluded that the district 
court could not review the denial of naturalization in Bellajaro 
because, while ' 1429 did not remove the court=s jurisdiction, it 
did limit the scope of review. Bellajaro, 378 F.3d at 1043B44.  
The Ninth Circuit held that Awhere . . . the INS has denied an 
application for naturalization on the basis of ' 1429 because 
removal proceedings are pending, the district courts have 
jurisdiction to review the denial but the scope of review is 
limited to >such= denial.@ Id. at 1046B47; see also Zayed, 368 
F.3d at 906 (AWhere the INS has denied an application for 
naturalization on the ground that removal proceedings are 
pending, therefore, the district court=s de novo review is limited 
to review of that threshold determination.@).  A denial by the 
Attorney General pursuant to ' 1429, however, is different from 
the situation presented in this case, where Gonzalez=s 
naturalization application was denied by the Attorney General 
on the merits.  As the decision under review is on the merits, 
jurisdiction is appropriate for a review and decision on the 
merits pursuant to ' 1421(c). Cf. Bellajaro, 378 F.3d at 1046 
(A[A decision on the merits] is a determination that the Attorney 
General has not yet made because of ' 1429, and it is one that 
the district courts, which no longer have the authority to 
naturalize, can not make in the first instance.@). 
Resolving the question of jurisdiction, however, is not the 
end of the matter.  Having decided that district courts have 
jurisdiction, we must now address the more difficult issue of 
what, if any, relief a district court may grant.
5
  This issue is more 
                                                 
5
 Unlike the dissent, we do not think we can affirm the 
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vexed because, pursuant to ' 1421(c), the sole authority to 
naturalize rests with the Attorney General, and such authority is 
limited by ' 1429.  This has led the Sixth Circuit to declare that 
Athe restraints that ' 1429 imposes upon the Attorney General 
prevent a district court from granting effective relief under ' 
1421(c) so long as removal proceedings are pending.@ Zayed, 
368 F.3d at 906.   
                                                                                                             
District Court=s decision to take jurisdiction and decide the case 
on the merits without addressing the capacity to grant relief.  In 
order for a district court to decide the case on the merits, it must 
it must be able to provide a meaningful remedy B otherwise dismissal for failure to 
state a claim would be the appropriate outcome as in Zayed, 368 F.3d at 906 (A[W]e 
do not read the amended ' 1429 as divesting the district courts of the jurisdiction 
granted under ' 1421(c). . . . [T]he restraints that ' 1429 imposes upon the Attorney 
General prevent a district court from granting effective relief under ' 1421(c) so long 
as removal proceedings are pending.@), and Ajlani v. Chertoff, 545 F.3d 229, 241 (2d 
Cir. 2008) (A[W]e conclude that the district court properly dismissed Ajlani=s 
' 1447(b) claim [permitting district court review if a petition for naturalization is not 
decided within 120 days] for failure to state a claim on which naturalization relief 
could be granted while removal proceedings were pending.@).    
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We are in agreement with the Sixth Circuit that Congress 
did not Aintend[] the priority of removal proceedings over 
naturalization proceedings to be altered by the 1990 
amendments.@ Id. at 905B06.  In light of this conclusion, we also 
agree that a district court cannot order the Attorney General to 
naturalize an alien who is subject to pendent removal 
proceedings. See id. at 906 n.5 (disagreeing with Ngwana v. 
Att=y Gen., 40 F. Supp. 2d 319, 322 (D. Md. 1999) (ordering 
alien naturalized despite pendency of removal proceedings)).
6
  
However, we do not conclude that district courts are, therefore, 
precluded from hearing a denial of naturalization case on the 
basis that no effective relief can be granted.
7
  Rather, we find 
                                                 
6
 For this same reason, although we agree with the 
District Court=s determination that it had both jurisdiction and 
the capacity to grant relief in this case, we do not endorse the 
District Court=s rationale.  The District Court found that ' 1429=s 
prohibition on the Attorney General Aconsidering an application 
for naturalization@ is inapplicable to a court order of 
naturalization because an order is not an application.  Gonzalez, 
684 F. Supp. 2d at 562B63.  Thus, a court order to naturalize an 
alien while in removal proceedings does not run afoul of the 
post-1990 version of ' 1429.  Id.  We cannot endorse the 
District Court=s reasoning because it does not comport with the 
priority of removal proceedings.  Unlike the District Court we 
find no reason to believe that the 1990 amendments altered the 
priority of removal that was established with the introduction of 
' 1429 in 1950. See Zayed, 368 F.3d at 905B06.  
7
 In this regard, we disagree with the Second Circuit=s 
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that declaratory relief is appropriate and sufficient in this 
context. 
                                                                                                             
holding in Ajlani, 545 F.3d at 241 and the Fifth Circuit=s holding 
in Saba-Bakare v. Chertoff, 507 F.3d 337, 340B41 (5th Cir. 
2007).  
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The Sixth Circuit raised the possibility of declaratory 
relief in Zayed but did not endorse it for two reasons.  First, the 
plaintiff in Zayed did not request declaratory relief. Zayed, 368 
F.3d at 906.  Second, the Court determined that declaratory 
relief would likely be effective only in light of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals= (ABIA@) decision in In re Cruz, 15 I. & N. 
Dec. 236 (1975). Zayed, 368 F.3d at 906B07.  In In re Cruz, the 
BIA held that a court declaration could provide prima facie 
eligibility for 8 C.F.R. ' 1239.2(f) (2011) (formerly 8 C.F.R. ' 
242.7), which Apermit[s] the alien to proceed to a final hearing 
on a pending application or petition for naturalization when the 
alien has established prima facie eligibility for naturalization 
and the matter involves exceptionally appealing or humanitarian 
factors . . . .@  The BIA reasoned that, because Aneither [the BIA] 
nor immigration judges have authority with respect to the 
naturalization of aliens,@ prima facie eligibility for naturalization 
could be established only Aby an affirmative communication 
from the [Immigration and Naturalization Service
8
] or by 
declaration of a court . . . .@ In re Cruz, 15 I. & N. Dec. at 237.  
However, the Sixth Circuit noted that whether In re Cruz 
remained good law after the 1990 amendments to the INA is in 
question.  Zayed, 368 F.3d at 907 n.6 (citing Apokarina, 93 F. 
App=x at 472). 
                                                 
8
 Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002), the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service has ceased to exist, and its enforcement 
functions have been transferred to the Department of Homeland 
Security. 
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Since Zayed, the BIA has reaffirmed its decision in In re 
Cruz.  See In re Hidalgo, 24 I. & N. Dec. 103, 106 (2007); see 
also Zegrean v. Att=y Gen., 602 F.3d 273, 275 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(deferring to the BIA=s interpretation of ' 1239.2(f)).  
Recognizing that the 1990 amendments to the INA divested the 
district courts from jurisdiction to grant or deny applications for 
naturalization in the first instance, the BIA found that an 
affirmative declaration from the Department of Homeland 
Security would be required to establish prima facie eligibility.  
See In re Hidalgo, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 106.  We are confident that 
the BIA would also accept the declaration of a district court 
properly exercising its jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. ' 1421(c).  
But we do not rest our decision on this basis.  Rather, for the 
reasons discussed below, we find that declaratory relief is 
appropriate notwithstanding whatever role it may play in 
terminating a removal proceeding under 8 C.F.R. ' 1239.2(f). 
Declaratory relief strikes a balance between the 
petitioner=s right to full judicial review as preserved by ' 
1421(c) and the priority of removal proceedings enshrined in 
' 1429.  Maintaining the petitioner=s right to judicial review of a 
naturalization denial is consistent with Congressional intent, as 
evidenced by the creation of ' 1421(c).  Rather than vest full 
and final authority to grant or deny a naturalization application 
with the Attorney General, Congress gave the district courts the 
power of de novo review.
9
  To hold that district courts are 
                                                 
9
 The legislative history of the Immigration Act of 1990 
also supports this view.  In discussing HB 1630 C the House 
companion bill to SB 358, which introduced the Immigration 
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precluded from review by ' 1429 whenever removal 
proceedings are pending raises the possibility that review may 
be cut off by the actions of the Attorney General. See 
Kestleboym v. Chertoff, 538 F. Supp. 2d 813, 818 (D.N.J. 2008); 
Ngwana, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 321B22.  Such a possibility is 
contrary to the intent of Congress as expressed in the structure 
of the statute.  Declaratory relief, in the form of a judgment 
regarding the lawfulness of the denial of naturalization, permits 
the alien a day in court, as required by ' 1421(c), while not 
upsetting the priority of removal over naturalization established 
in ' 1429 because it affects the record forCbut not the priority 
ofCremoval proceedings, thereby preserving both 
congressionally mandated goals, a de novo review process and 
the elimination of the race to the courthouse. 
B. Genuine Issue of Material Fact 
Having determined that the District Court=s review of 
                                                                                                             
and Nationality Act of 1990 C on the floor of the House, the 
bill=s sponsor, Rep. Bruce Morrison, remarked that AH.R. 1630 
does not take away any of the judicial review rights accorded 
applicants today.@ 135 Cong. Rec. 16,996 (1989). The Senate 
Judiciary Committee wrote in its Report, that A[t]he Committee 
strongly believes that although few cases for naturalization have 
been denied, citizenship is the most valued governmental benefit 
of this land and applicants should receive full recourse to the 
Judiciary when the request for that benefit is denied.@ S. Rep. 
No. 101-187, at 14 (1989).  
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Gonzalez=s naturalization denial was proper, we address whether 
summary judgment was properly granted in favor of the 
Appellee.  AThe court shall grant summary judgment if the 
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.@ 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  A Amaterial fact@ is one Athat might affect 
the outcome of the suit under the governing law . . . .@ Anderson 
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).  A dispute is 
Agenuine@ if Athe evidence is such that a reasonable jury could 
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.@ Id. 
In order for Gonzalez to succeed in his naturalization 
petition, he must show that he is a person of good moral 
character. 8 U.S.C. ' 1427(a).10  The INA defines Agood moral 
character@ to exclude any person Awho has given false testimony 
for the purpose of obtaining any benefits@ under the immigration 
and nationality laws of the United States. 8 U.S.C. ' 
1101(f)(6).
11
  The Supreme Court has held that ' 1101(f)(6) 
                                                 
10
 ANo person . . . shall be naturalized unless such 
applicant . . . during all periods referred to in this subsection has 
been and still is a person of good moral character . . . .@ 8 U.S.C. 
' 1427(a). 
11
 ANo person shall be regarded as, or found to be, a 
person of good moral character who, during the period for 
which good moral character is required to be established, is, or 
was one who has given false testimony for the purpose of 
obtaining any benefits under this chapter.@ 8 U.S.C. ' 
1101(f)(6).  Unfortunately for Gonzalez, the statute will not 
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requires Aoral statements made under oath . . . with the 
subjective intent of obtaining immigration benefits.@ Kungys v. 
United States, 485 U.S. 759, 780 (1988) (citations omitted).  A 
misrepresentation under ' 1101(f)(6) need not be material to 
undermine an applicant=s good moral character. Id. (A[The 
statute] denominates a person to be of bad moral character on 
account of having given false testimony if he has told even the 
most immaterial of lies with the subjective intent of obtaining 
immigration or naturalization benefits.@). 
                                                                                                             
permit acts of good moral characterCsuch as taking 
responsibility for, and giving priority to, his natural familyCto 
be recognized as exception or mitigation to his testimony. 
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Two key facts are undisputed in this case: (1) Gonazlez 
stated in his I-751 interview that he had no children of his own, 
and (2) Gonzalez has now recognized YGP and AGP as his 
children.
12
  What is in dispute is whether there are material facts 
sufficient to raise a genuine dispute over Gonzalez=s subjective 
intent to give false testimony during his I-751 interview.  
Gonzalez makes three arguments supporting the 
existence of a genuine dispute.  In his first argument, Gonzalez 
asserts that his petition cannot be denied on summary judgment 
because there is no admissible evidence on the record that he 
gave false testimony. Appellant=s Br. 14B17.  Gonzalez argues 
that the declaration of USCIS officer Makesha Clark, 
Declaration of Makesha Clark, App. 203B04 (hereinafter AClark 
Decl.@), is inadmissible hearsay and cannot be considered on 
summary judgment. Appellant=s Br. 15B16.13  Because this is the 
                                                 
12
 We, like the District Court, take judicial notice of the 
amended birth certificates for YGP and AGP listing Gonzalez as 
the father. Amended Birth Certificate of YGP, App. 231; 
Amended Birth Certificate of AGP, App. 235.  
13
 Gonzalez also argues that the Clark Declaration is not 
evidence that Gonzalez gave false testimony because it is not 
clear whether Otero or Gonzalez made relevant statements in the 
interview.  This argument is without merit as Clark=s 
Declaration clearly states that A[Gonzalez] was asked to orally 
affirm his written answers to each question. . . . In his sworn 
testimony Mr. Gonzlez represented that he . . . had no children.@ 
Clark Decl. && 5 & 7, App. 204. 
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only evidence of oral statements by Gonzalez, if it is 
inadmissible there is no evidence on the record that Gonzalez 
gave false testimony. See Kungys, 485 U.S. at 780 
(A>[T]estimony= is limited to oral statements made under oath.@). 
Affidavits and declarations considered on summary 
judgment must, Aset out facts that would be admissible in 
evidence . . . .@ Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4).  Hearsay statements are 
inadmissible, Fed. R. Evid. 802, and the Federal Rules of 
Evidence define hearsay as Aa statement that: (1) the declarant 
does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and 
(2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted in the statement.@ Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). 
Clark=s declaration is not hearsay because it is not being 
offered for the truth of the mattered asserted, i.e., that Gonzalez 
did or did not have children; rather, Clark=s declaration is being 
offered to prove what Gonzalez said at his I-751 interview.  AIf 
the significance of an offered statement lies solely in the fact 
that it was made, no issue is raised as to the truth of anything 
asserted, and the statement is not hearsay.@ Fed. R. Evid. 801(c) 
advisory committee=s note; see also Anderson v. United States, 
417 U.S. 211, 219B20 (1974) (holding statements non-hearsay 
where Athe point of the prosecutor=s introducing those statements 
was simply to prove that the statements were made so as to 
establish a foundation for later showing, through other 
admissible evidence, that they were false@ (footnotes omitted)). 
As non-hearsay, Clark=s declaration would be admissible 
at trial; therefore, it is admissible for the purpose of summary 
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judgment.  
Gonzalez next argues that he could not have made a false 
statement because, at the time of his I-751 interview, YGP and 
AGP were not his children according to the definition of a child 
in the INA. Appellant=s Br. 9B14.  Gonzalez asserts that YGP 
and AGP, who were illegitimate at the time of Gonzalez=s I-751 
interview, and therefore do not meet any of the enumerated 
definitions of a child found at 8 U.S.C. ' 1101(b)(1).  Whether 
YGP and AGP fall outside the statutory definition is irrelevant 
because that definition does not control in the context of Form I-
751 or the I-751 interview. 
The definition of a child found in ' 1101(b)(1) is a 
statutory definition.  It establishes the meaning of the word 
Achild@ when that word is used in the context of the INA, not 
elsewhere.  When Gonzalez was asked to fill out Form I-751 
and to affirm his answers during the interview, he was not being 
asked to enforce or interpret the INA.
14
  To assume such is to 
                                                 
14
  Had the immigration benefit Gonzalez was seeking 
during his I-751 interview depended upon whether YGP and 
AGP were his children, and was the question of whether YGP 
and AGP were legally children of Gonzalez under the INA 
before this court, then 8 U.S.C. ' 1101(b)(1) would be relevant. 
 That, however, is not the situation in this case.  Before us is the 
question of whether Gonzalez knew he had children and lied 
about it to immigration authorities.  See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 
787, 788B89 (1977) (noting that 8 U.S.C. ' 1101(b)(1) exists to 
provide immigration preferences to some and deny them to 
others, particularly illegitimate children seeking preference 
through the paternal relationship and vice-versa).  As Gonzalez 
was not seeking immigration preference based on his parent-
child relationship his recourse to this definition is unwarranted.   
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export a term of art from the statute into conventional usage, 
which invites unnecessarily legalistic and absurd outcomes.
15
 
                                                 
15
 Section 1101(b)(1) defines a child first as Aan 
unmarried person under twenty-one years of age,@ and then goes 
on to define various categories of Achild@ for the purposes of the 
immigration statute. ' 1101(b)(1).  According to Gonzalez=s 
argument, if an individual were asked whether he or she has 
children during an immigration proceeding, this question would 
not include any progeny who had married or passed their 
twenty-first birthday.  It stretches reason to think that USCIS 
does not consider these persons children of the applicant or that 
Congress intended to create such a situation when it wrote the 
definition of a child into the INA. 
Because the statutory definition is inapplicable to 
Gonalez=s case and applying the definition is unwarranted and 
ill-advised, we hold that this argument is unavailing. 
Gonzalez=s final argument is that he lacked the subjective 
intent to give false testimony because he did not believe AGP 
and YGP were his children; in short, Gonzalez argues that, at the 
time of his I-751 interview, he honestly believed he had no 
children.  Appellant=s Br. 17B19.  At issue is whether Gonzalez=s 
own statements in this regard are sufficient to survive summary 
judgement on the question of his intent to give false testimony. 
As a general proposition, Aconclusory, self-serving 
affidavits are insufficient to withstand a motion for summary 
judgment.@ Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., 560 
F.3d 156, 161 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Lujan v. Nat=l Wildlife Fed=n, 
497 U.S. 871, 888B89.  Though we have held that under certain 
circumstances, Aa sworn assertion of an absence of knowledge 
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can suffice to create a genuine issue of material fact,@ we have 
also noted that Aa bare but sworn assertion of a claimant=s lack 
of knowledge will not suffice to create a material dispute of fact 
where that assertion is impeached by a well supported showing 
to the contrary.@  United States v. 717 S. Woodward St., 2 F.3d 
529, 533 (3d Cir. 1993).   
In this case, Gonzalez=s own, sworn statements are 
insufficient to survive summary judgment.  First, we note that 
the District Court made several findings that it determined were 
Arevelatory that [Gonzalez] is the father.@ Gonzalez, 2011 WL 
941299, at *5.  These findings included: 
He was having relations with the mother at 
around the time each child was conceived.  His 
relationship with the mother continued over time 
and continues to this day.  He helped support the 
mother over the course of her pregnancy, and 
increased his support when, in the late stages of 
pregnancy, she was unable to work.  When the 
children were born, the mother told him that he 
was the father.  There is some evidence to support 
the inference that he took tax deductions for these 
children in the years immediately following their 
births.  He allowed the children to call him Adad.@ 
And, as explained, [Gonzalez] amended (with the 
mother) the birth certificates.  
Id. (footnote omitted).  Counterposed to the evidence relied 
upon by the District Court is only Gonzalez=s own statements 
that he did not know or believe that YGP and AGP were his 
children at the time of his I-751 interview.  However, any issue 
of material fact raised by Gonzalez=s assertion is insufficient in 
light of the circumstantial evidence of his knowledge.  He had 
relations with the mother around the time of conception; he was 
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told by the mother that the children were his; he developed a 
relationship with the children; he did not adopt the children but 
amended the birth certificates to reflect himself as the biological 
fatherCall of which indicates that if Gonzalez was ignorant of 
his paternal relationship it was a willful ignorance. Cf. 717 S. 
Woodward St., 2 F.3d at 534 (AAn affidavit of the claimant 
denying knowledge is competent evidence tending to show this 
and in the absence of other evidence rendering it incredible, 
such an affidavit creates a genuine issue of material fact.@ 
(emphasis added)).   
Because state of mind is the key issue on the merits, 
Gonzalez=s own statements cannot be dismissed simply because 
they are bare and self-serving.  However, the circumstantial 
evidence offered by the Appellee both undermines and 
outweighs Gonzalez=s claim of ignorance, such that this is a case 
where Athe court, based on all of the evidence, can say with 
confidence that a rational trier of fact could not credit the 
claimant=s denial . . . .@ Id. 
Because there is no genuine dispute regarding Gonzalez=s 
false testimony in his I-751 interview, we find the District 
Court=s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Appellee 
appropriate. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the decision of 
the District Court granting summary judgment in favor of the 
Defendant-Appellee. 
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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part. 
 
 While I concur with my learned colleagues that the 
District Court had jurisdiction to review a denial of 
naturalization while removal proceedings were pending and 
that the District Court properly granted summary judgment in 
favor of the Secretary, I respectfully disagree with the 
majority insofar as it determined that Gonzalez could have 
received declaratory relief had he proven his case on the 
merits.   
 
I believe it is unnecessary and perhaps problematic for 
the Court to decide this thorny issue for several reasons.  
First, we conclude (as did the District Court) that Gonzalez’s 
claims fail on the merits, so there is no need to opine about 
relief that might have been available to him had he succeeded.  
See Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 
397 (2003) (declining to reach the issue of the availability of 
private injunctive relief under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) where 
there was no underlying violation of the RICO statute); 
Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip 
Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912, 935 n.20 (3d Cir. 1999) (same); 
see generally 13 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & 
Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3531.3 
(3d ed. 2008) (noting “our tradition that unnecessary judicial 
decisions should be avoided”).  Second, Gonzalez never 
specifically requested declaratory relief and, of course, the 
District Court never granted him declaratory relief.  Third, the 
parties did not brief this issue on appeal, so I believe we 
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should avoid resolving the issue.  See United States v. McKie, 
73 F.3d 1149, 1155 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting “the parties did 
not brief the issue and we generally hesitate to decide non-
jurisdictional questions without briefing”); see also Bd. of 
Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 n.1 (2001) (declining to 
decide whether employment discrimination claims can be 
brought under Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act 
“when the parties have not favored us briefing on the 
statutory question”); NLRB v. Washington Heights-W. 
Harlem-Inwood Mental Health Council, Inc., 897 F.2d 1238, 
1248 (2d Cir. 1990) (declining to resolve an issue “because 
the parties did not brief this issue and because its resolution is 
not necessary to our holding today”).  Fourth, and as the 
majority acknowledges, our decision in this regard is contrary 
to that reached by three of our sister Courts of Appeals and, 
as a result, creates a split in authority.  See generally 13 
Wright, Miller, & Cooper, supra, § 3531.3 (“The concern that 
unnecessary decisions be avoided has its most important 
justification in the prospect that unnecessary decisions may 
be wrong decisions.”). 
 
For these reasons, I would avoid reaching the issue and 
would leave the issue to another day when its resolution is 
necessary and the issue is properly briefed by the parties.  
 
